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The booklet prints no question (question 4, as the candidate numbers it); the answer is written to the question of the Bertrand model of oligopoly.

Mohit Aggarwal Nadbaiwalla, AIR 281, 2025

Bertrand model of oligopoly, is the duopoly model, where - a) There are two similar firms, with b) unlimited Capacity to produce c) Producing homogeneous product d) marginal cost assumed to be Costant e) simultaneous price setting model.

The firms observe eachother, And focused on price competition by simultaneously learning about eachother.

They have opportunity to collude and charge monopoly price, and maximise profit, but they have no credible belief on Each other and threat of losing the entire market if competitor reduce the price, force them to charge price equal to marginal cost i.e. Price of Perfect Competition, even there are only 2 firms.

Nash equilibrium, via backward induction exists at Competitive price as they have no- credible punishment strategy.

| Firm-1 \ Firm 2 | Collude | Not collude | |---|---|---| | Collude | (3,3) | (0,2) | | Not collude | (2,0) | (1,1) |

out come matrix

They have to make peace with (1,1). 'and' in the above 'Matrix' as this is the nash equilibrium.

Assumption of Unlimited capacity is unrealistic, Edgeworth solved this issue, but in that situation, there is no permanent equilibrium