Topper Copies

Two firm face the market demand curve: Q(p) = 160 − 2P where P is price Q is output and Q= Q1 + Q2 . Each firm has a marginal cost equal to 2. (i) What are the profit maximizing quantities for the two firm if they act as Cournot competitors? (ii) What are the profit maximizing prices and quantities for the firms if they act as Bertrand competitors? (iii) What are output levels for the two firms, if firm 1 act as the Stackelberg leader?

S Varshith Reddy, AIR 259, 2025

Given Q(p) = 160 - 2P Q = Q₁ + Q₂ MC = 2.

(i) In Cournot competition, firm have zero conjectual variation and equate MR=MC at equilibrium.

2P = 160 - Q P = 80 - ½Q = 80 - ½(Q₁ + Q₂) TR₁ = PQ₁ = 80Q₁ - ½Q₁² - ½Q₁Q₂ MR₁ = 80 - Q₁ - ½Q₂ At eq. MR₁ = MC => 80 - Q₁ - ½Q₂ = 2. Q₁ = 78 - ½Q₂ Similarly, Q₂ = 78 - ½Q₂ As in Cournot duopoly model with homogenous products, both firms produce same quantities ∴ Q₁ = Q₂. Q₁ = 78 - 1/2 Q₁ 3/2 Q₁ = 78 => Q₁ = 52 = Q₂ ∴ Profit maximizing quantities for each firm is 52.

(ii) In Bertrand model, firms charge price equal to marginal cost. ∴ P = MC = 2. Q = Q₁ + Q₂ = 160 - 2(2) = 156 Both the firms produce same quantities in Bertrand model ∴ 2Q₁ = 156 => Q₁ = Q₂ = 78 ∴ Profit maximizing price is 2 and quantity for each firm is 78.

(iii) Firm 1 acts as a stackelberg leader and 2 firm is a follower and acts as cournot duopolist. Hence from above, Q₂ = 78 - ½Q₁ Firm 1 incorporates this reaction pattern TR₁ = 80Q₁ - ½Q₁² - ½Q₁(78 - ½Q₁) = 80Q₁ - ½Q₁² - 39Q₁ + ¼Q₁² MR₁ = 80 - Q₁ - 39 + ½Q₁ = 41 - ½Q₁ At eq. MR₁ = MC => 41 - ½Q₁ = 2 ½Q₁ = 39. Q₁ = 78 Q₂ = 78 - ½(78) = 39.