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Discuss the Stackelberg model of oligopoly. How does it differ from Cournot model in terms of assumptions about firm behavior? What is the significance of the first-mover advantage in this model?

S Varshith Reddy, AIR 259, 2025

Stackelberg model of oligopoly explains first mover advantage as the first mover conjectures the output changes of the rival firms in response to changes of its own variables.

This model assumes zero conjectural variation for the follower who takes decisions by assuming the other firms keeps the outputs constant.

Assumptions: - Duopoly model => first mover and a follower - Homogenous products - Zero conjectural variation for follower

This model differs from Lournot's model as both firms do not take the decisions simultaneously. Though both models work on quantity adjustment, in Stackelberg model, first mover takes the decision based on the reaction of other firms. The follower acts like a cournot duopolist. In a pure cournot model with identical costs, the output produced by both firms would be the same, but this differs in case of Stackelberg model as the first mover has an advantage and thus produces more than the follower.

Significance of first mover advantage can be explained as follows. Let P = a - bQ be the demand function where Q = Q_a + Q_b and MC be = k.

The follower follows as a duopolist. Let 1 be follower ∴ TR_1 = PQ_1 = aQ_1 - bQ_1(Q_a + Q_2) = aQ_1 - bQ_1^2 - bQ_1Q_2 MR_1 = a - 2bQ_1 - bQ_2

At eq. MR_1 = MC a - 2bQ_1 - bQ_2 = k Q_1 = a - bQ_2 - k / 2b

Whereas the first mover understand the interdependence and incoeporates the reaction pattern.

TR_2 = PQ_2 = aQ_2 - bQ_2^2 - bQ_1Q_2 = aQ_2 - bQ_2^2 - bQ_2 (a - bQ_2 / 2b) = 1/2 aQ_2 - 1/2 bQ_2^2 MR_2 = a/2 - bQ_2.

MR_2 = MC at equilibrium a/2 - bQ_2 = k => a/2 - k = bQ_2 Q_2 = a - 2k / 2b

Q_1 = a - b((a-2k)/2b) - k / 2b = a - a/2 -k-k / 2b = a - [?]k / 4b

∴ First mover would be able to produce more than the follower and thus it is ideal to enter the market first and gain knowledge of market conditions and reaction patterns of rival firms.