Two firm face the market demand curve: Q(p) = 160 − 2P where P is price Q is output and Q= Q1 + Q2 . Each firm has a marginal cost equal to 2. (i) What are the profit maximizing quantities for the two firm if they act as Cournot competitors? (ii) What are the profit maximizing prices and quantities for the firms if they act as Bertrand competitors? (iii) What are output levels for the two firms, if firm 1 act as the Stackelberg leader?
Monika Srivastava, AIR 16, 2025
(i)
Cournot competitors : output adjustments where output of each firm = (1/n+1) Total output = (n/n+1) where n is no of firms-
P₁ = 80 - Q/2 , P₂ = 80 - Q/2
TR₁ = P₁Q₁ = Q₁(80 - ½(Q₁+Q₂)) TR₁ = 80Q₁ - Q₁²/2 - Q₂Q₁/2 MR₁ = 80 - Q₁ - Q₂/2 MC₁ = 2 MR₁ = MC₁ 80 - Q₁ - Q₂/2 = 2 78 = Q₁ + Q₂/2
By Symmetry, 78 = Q₂ + Q₁/2
Q₁ = Q₂ => 3Q₁/2 = 78 Q₁ = 52 Q₁ = Q₂ = 52
P₁ = 80 - (2 x 52 / 2) = 80-52 = 28
Hence, P₁ = P₂ = 28 Q₁ = Q₂ = 52
[a graph of Q₂ against Q₁ with two downward-sloping reaction lines crossing at the Nash equilibrium, 52 marked on both axes]
(ii)
Bertrand competitors:- Price adjustments until price equals marginal cost. Output and price equals competitive prices and output despite 2 firms (Bertrand Paradox)
P₁ = P₂ = 2
Hence, Q = 160 - 2(2) = 160-4 = 156
Both firms will produce equal output Q₁ = Q₂ = 78
(iii)
Stackelberg model : Sophisticated firm incorporates response curve of naive firm and maximises its profit
As given Firm 1 act as leader
TR₁ = 80 Q₁ - Q₁²/2 - Q₁Q₂/2 ——— ①
Also, as found in part (i) Reaction curve of firm 2 : Q₂ + Q₁/2 = 78 ∴ Q₂ = 78 - Q₁/2
Putting value of Q₂ in ①
TR₁ = 80Q₁ - Q₁²/2 - Q₁/2 (78 - Q₁/2)
= 80Q₁ - Q₁²/2 - 39Q₁ + Q₁²/4
= 80Q₁ - 39Q₁ - Q₁²/4
= 41Q₁ - Q₁²/4
MR₁ = 41 - Q₁/2 = MC = 2
39 = Q₁/2 => Q₁ = 78
Q₂ = 78 - 78/2 = 39
Hence, under Stackelberg model,
Q_leader = 78 Q_follower = 39
[a graph of Q₂ against Q₁ with the two best-response lines "From 1BR" and "From 2BR" crossing at a circled point, 78 marked on the Q₁ axis and 39 on the Q₂ axis]