Two firm face the market demand curve: Q(p) = 160 − 2P where P is price Q is output and Q= Q1 + Q2 . Each firm has a marginal cost equal to 2. (i) What are the profit maximizing quantities for the two firm if they act as Cournot competitors? (ii) What are the profit maximizing prices and quantities for the firms if they act as Bertrand competitors? (iii) What are output levels for the two firms, if firm 1 act as the Stackelberg leader?
Mohit Aggarwal Nadbaiwalla, AIR 281, 2025
q(p) = 160 - 2p ; p = (160 - q)/2
q = q1 + q2
mc = 2
(i) In Cournot Competition (noncollusion and quantity based Competition)
q = reaction function of both must intersect
π1 = ((160-q)/2) q1 - 2q1 π2 = (160-(q1-q2)) q2 - 2q2
F.O.C
π2 = (160 - q1 - q2) q2 - 2q2 = dπ2/dq2 = 160 - q1 + 2q2 - 2 = 0
π1 = 160 - q2 - 2q1 - 2 = 0
q1 = (156 - q2)/2 ①
q2 = (156 - q1)/2 ②
solving eq ① and ②
q1 = (2×156 - 156 + q1)/4 = 312 - 158 + q1
= 156 = 3q1 => q1 = 156/3 = 52
and q2 = 156/3 = 52
(ii) In Bertrand competition, firms actually engaged in price competition. since this is the case of homogeneous quantity, [Perfect competition] output and price will be in the equilibrium due to Bertrand Paradox and existence of nash-equilibrium at perfectly competitive price.
to solve · MC = AR
=> 2 = (160-q)/2
=> [q = 156]
the price will be = 2 and quantity produced will be
q1 = q2 = 156/2 = (78)
Which is more than Cournot's i.e. 158/3
(iii) In stalkleberg model, mutual interdependence is recognised, therefore, firm 1 (leader) will incorporate reaction function of firm 2 in his profit function.
leader follower (firm-2)
q = 160-2p
p = (160-q)/2
π₁ = 1/2 (160-(q₁+q₂)) q₁ -2q₁
π₂ = 1/2 (160-q₁-q₂) q₂ -2q₂
dπ₂/dq₂ = 0
q₂ = (156-q₁)/2 ①
substituting
π₁ = 1/2 [160-(q₁ + (156-q₁)/2)] q₁ - 2q₁
dπ₁/dq₁ = 0 => 1/2 [160-2q₁-78+q₁] -2
=> 82-q₁ = 4
q₁=78
And q₂ = (156-78)/2 => 78/2 = 39
Output level of leader is 78, and followers is 39