The inverse demand function in a duopoly market is P = 300 − Q where Q = Q1 + Q2, Q is the total output and Q1 and Q2 are the output of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of Rs. 30 per unit and zero fixed cost. (i) Suppose both the firms decide their output simultaneously. What are the quantities chosen by each firm? What are the market price and profit of both the firms? (ii) Suppose now that the firms decide their output sequentially and the first is the market leader and the second is the follower. What are the quantities chosen by both the firms? What are the market price and profit of both firms? (iii) Draw reaction curve diagrams for the above two cases. Compare the market price in part (i) with that in part (ii).
Tarun Pawar, AIR 311, 2025
(i)
Since firms compete in quantity and decide output simultaneously, we use Cournot model.
P = 300 - (Q₁ + Q₂)
MC = 30
TR₁ = [300 - (Q₁ + Q₂)] Q₁
MR₁ = 300 - 2Q₁ - Q₂
MC₁ = 30
MR₁ = MC₁
Q₁ = (270 - Q₂)/2 - ①
↓
Reaction fn. of firm ①
Similarly, reaction fn. of firm ② is :-
Q₂ = (270 - Q₁)/2 - ②
Using ① & ②
Q₁ = (270 - [(270 - Q₁)/2]) / 2
Q₁ - Q₁/4 = 270/4
Q₁ = 90
Q₂ = (270 - Q₁)/2 = (270 - 90)/2
Q₂ = 90
Price = 300 - (Q₁ + Q₂) = 120
π₁ = TR₁ - TC₁ = 90(120) - 30(90) = 10,800 - 2,700 = 8,100
π₂ = TR₂ - TC₂ = 8,100
(ii)
The given explanation calls for use of 'Stakleberg model'.
Firm 1 is leader, thus he takes into account reaction fn. of firm ②
Q₂ = (270 - Q₁)/2
P = 300 - (Q₁ + Q₂) = 300 - (Q₁ + (270 - Q₁)/2)
P = 165 - Q₁/2
For profit maximization,
TR₁ = P. Q₁ = 165 Q₁ − Q₁²/2
MR₁ = 165 − Q₁
MC = 30
MR₁ = MC, => Q₁ = 135
Q₂ = (270 − 135)/2 = 67.5
Price = 300 − (135 + 67.5) = 97.5
π₁ = TR₁ − TC₁ = (97.5)(135) − 30(135) = 13,162.5 − 4050 = 9,112.5
π₂ = TR₂ − TC₂ = (97.5)(67.5) − (30)(67.5) = 6581.25 − 2025 = 4,556.25
(iii) Reaction curves
Cournot Model
[a graph of Q2 against Q1 with Firm 1's reaction curve (270 on the Q2 axis to 135 on the Q1 axis) and Firm 2's reaction curve (135 on the Q2 axis to 270 on the Q1 axis), meeting at 90, 90]
Stackleberg model
[a graph of Q2 against Q1 with the two reaction lines meeting at C, and the leader's isoprofit curve tangent to the follower's reaction curve at S, with 135 marked on Q1 and 67.5 on Q2]
- optimum of leader firm 1 is on tangency point as of isoprofit curve with reaction curve of follower firm.
Comparison of price
Price in cournot model > Price in Stuckleberg model
120 > 97.5