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The booklet prints no question (question 4(a)); the answer is written to the question of how adverse selection and moral hazard arise from informational asymmetry and what they do to markets.

Dipti Ranjan Pati, AIR 164, 2024

The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard emerge from informational asymmetries in the market place.

Adverse selection occurs when seller [?] distinguishing between types has an informational advantage over buyers and uses this information to forces buyers into a sub-optimal position.

Market for lemons is the most classic case of adverse selection (Akerlof). Since the buyer can't distinguish between a good car and a bad car (lemon) in the second-hand car market, it gets flooded with sub-par quality cars.

The insurance market also witnesses adverse selection when insurers charge a higher than fair actuarial price to buyers.

Moral Hazard [?] entails a buyer-side informational advantage.

In the insurance market, a buyer can engage in improper behaviour after the purchase of an insurance product.

For example, the presence of [?] health insurance may alter the nature of behaviour relative to without it.

→ So, sellers have to try and find out the buyer type before offering a particular product. - potential smokers would be charged higher than non-smokers.

→ The Credit market, where loan waivers are constantly given, also suffers from moral hazard as borrowers expect their govt. [?] and don't repay their debt.

So, both adverse selection & moral hazard entail market inefficiencies.