Topper Copies

The booklet prints no question (question 2(a)); the answer is written to a duopoly problem with market demand P = 300 - Q, Q = q1 + q2 and marginal cost of 30 for both firms with no fixed cost, asking for the Cournot equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium with firm 1 as leader, and the reaction curves of the two models.

Aditi Chhaparia, AIR 97, 2024

P = 300 - Q Q = q1 + q2 MC1 = MC2 = 30 & No fixed cost

(i) Cournot Model each firm will maximize its profit given the output of the other firm.

Firm 1 π1 = Pq1 - MCq1 = [300 - (q1+q2)] q1 - 30q1 = 300q1 - q1² - q2q1 - 30q1 ∂π1/∂q1 = 300 - 2q1 - q2 - 30 = 0 ∴ q1* = (270 - q2)/2

Similarly, due to symmetry of cost and demand. q2* = (270 - q1)/2

Putting q2* in q1* => q1* = (270 − (270 − q1)/2) / 2 => q1* = (270 − 270/2 + q1/2) / 2 Eq 2 2q1* = 270/2 + q1/2 => 3q1/2 = 270/2 ∴ q1* = 90 Similarly q2* = 90 P* = 300 − (180) P* = 120

π1* = 120 × 90 − 30 × 90 = 90 × 90 = 2700 π2* = 120 × 90 − 30 × 90 = 2700

(ii) Stackelberg Model If the firm 1 is leader then it takes firm 2's BR fn in its own profit max fn and firm 2 acts as Cournot duopoint

π₁ = 300q₁ - q₁² - q₁ ( (270 - q₁)/2 ) - 30q₁

π₁ = 300q₁ - q₁² - q₁ 270/2 + q₁²/2 - 30q₁

∂π₁/∂q₁ = 300 - 2q₁ - 270/2 + q₁ - 30 = 0

=> 270 - 270/2 = q₁

∴ q₁* = 270/2 = 135

q₂* = (270 - 135)/2 = 135/2

P = 300 - ( 135 + 135/2 )

P* = 195/2

π₁* = 195/2 x 135 - 30 x 135 = 135/2 x 135 = 17,225/2

π₂* = ( 195/2 x 135/2 ) - 135 x 30/2 = 135/2 x 135/2 = 17,225/4

(iii) Reaction curves Reaction curve shows the best response fn of a firm to different level's of its rival's production/ prices.

Cournot case 1

[reaction-curve graph: downward-sloping 1st BR (q₂) and 2nd BR (q₁) meeting at E, y-axis marked a-c/b and a-c/3b, x-axis marked a-c/2b and a-c/3b]

Nash equilibrium attained where q₁ = q₂ = a-c/3b

Stackelberg case 1.

[reaction-curve graph: 1st BR and 2nd BR meeting at E, y-axis marked a-c/4b, x-axis marked a-c/2b]

Nash equilibrium attained where q₁ = a-c/2b q₂ = a-c/4b

The prices in Stackelberg (ii) model are higher than Cournot (i) since higher extent of the market is produced (3/4 > 2/3) which reduces prices