Topper Copies

The inverse demand function in a duopoly market is P = 300 − Q where Q = Q1 + Q2, Q is the total output and Q1 and Q2 are the output of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of Rs. 30 per unit and zero fixed cost. (i) Suppose both the firms decide their output simultaneously. What are the quantities chosen by each firm? What are the market price and profit of both the firms? (ii) Suppose now that the firms decide their output sequentially and the first is the market leader and the second is the follower. What are the quantities chosen by both the firms? What are the market price and profit of both firms? (iii) Draw reaction curve diagrams for the above two cases. Compare the market price in part (i) with that in part (ii).

Tanvi Gupta, AIR 187, 2024

P = 300 - Q Q = Q1 + Q2 MC = 30

(1) If both firms decide output simultaneously, they determine monopoly output & maximise joint profits

πjoint = P.Q - MC.Q

= [300 - (Q1+Q2)]Q - 30Q

= 300Q - Q² - 30Q

∂π/∂Q = 0

∴ 300 - 2Q - 30 = 0

Q = 270/2 = 135

Thus, each produces half of total output i.e. 67.5 each

- market price (P) = 300 - 135 = 165 - monopoly profit = 300(135) - (135)² - 30(135)

= 40,500 - 18225 - 4050

= 18225

This (π) is shared equally by both firms i.e 9112.5 each

(ii) If firms decide output sequentially, it is stackelberg model.

follower's reaction curve:

π₁ = [300 - (Q₁+Q₂)] Q₁ - mc Q₁

= [300 - (Q₁ + Q₂)] Q₁ - 30 Q₁

= 300Q₁ - Q₁² - Q₁Q₂ - 30Q₁

= 270 Q₁ - Q₁² - Q₁Q₂

∂π₁/∂Q₁ = 270 - 2Q₁ - Q₂

∴ Q₁ = (270 - Q₂)/2

Q₁ = 135 - Q₂/2

Leader incorporates it in his own profit function.

π₂ = (300 - Q₁ - Q₂) Q₂ - mc Q₂

= 300 Q₂ - Q₁Q₂ - Q₂² - 30 Q₂

= 270 Q₂ - Q₂² - Q₂ (135 - Q₂/2)

= 270 Q₂ - Q₂² - 135 Q₂ + Q₂²/2

= 135 Q₂ - Q₂²/2

∂π₂/∂Q = 0 ∴ 135 - 2Q₂/2 = 0

135 - Q₂ = 0

∴ Q₂ = 135

Thus, Q₁ = 135 - 135/2 = 67.5

(Q₁; Q₂) = (67.5, 135)

MP₁ = 300 - 202.5 = 97.5 = MP₂

∴ price = 97.5 for both

π₁ = (97.5)(67.5) - 30(67.5)

= 6581.25 - 2025

= 4556.25

(III) Reaction curves.