Topper Copies

The inverse demand function in a duopoly market is P = 300 − Q where Q = Q1 + Q2, Q is the total output and Q1 and Q2 are the output of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of Rs. 30 per unit and zero fixed cost. (i) Suppose both the firms decide their output simultaneously. What are the quantities chosen by each firm? What are the market price and profit of both the firms? (ii) Suppose now that the firms decide their output sequentially and the first is the market leader and the second is the follower. What are the quantities chosen by both the firms? What are the market price and profit of both firms? (iii) Draw reaction curve diagrams for the above two cases. Compare the market price in part (i) with that in part (ii).

Apoorva Agrawal, AIR 65, 2024

Given :- P = 300 - Q Q = Q1 + Q2 MC1 = MC2 = 30 FC = 0 (Fixed Cost)

(i) Simultaneous quantity determination Cournot Model

Best response Curve of Firm 1 :-

π1 = TR1 - TC1 = P . Q1 - 30 . Q1 = (300 - Q) Q1 - 30 Q1 = [300 - (Q1+Q2)] Q1 - 30 Q1 = 300 Q1 - Q1^2 - Q1.Q2 - 30 Q1 π1 = 270 Q1 - Q1^2 - Q1 . Q2

∂π1/∂Q1 | Q2‾ = 270 - 2 Q1 - Q2 = 0

=> 2 Q1 + Q2 = 270 ---- ①

Best response Curve for Firm 2 :-

π2 = TR2 - TC2 = P.Q2 - 30 Q2 = (300 - Q1 - Q2) Q2 - 30 Q2 = 300 Q2 - Q1.Q2 - Q2^2 - 30 Q2 π2 = 270 Q2 - Q2^2 - Q1.Q2

∂π2/∂Q2 |Q1 = 270 - 2Q2 - Q1 = 0 => 2Q2 + Q1 = 270 —②

Solving ① & ② :- (2Q1 + Q2 = 270) x1 (Q1 + 2Q2 = 270) x2 2Q1 + Q2 = 270 2Q1 + 4Q2 = 540 -3Q2 = -270 Q2* = 90 Q1* = 270 - 180 = 90. Q* = Q1* + Q2* = 180 P* = 300 - Q = 300 - 180 = 120

Profit of Firm 1 :- P.Q1 - 30.Q1 = (P-30) Q1 = (120-30) x 90 = 90x90 = 8100

Profit of firm 2 :- P·Q2 − 30·Q2 = (P−30) × Q2 = 90 × 90 = 8100

(ii) Sequential output determination Stackelberg Model

First firm is leader :- It maximises its profit, subject to reaction curve of firm − 2.

→ π1 = 270 Q1 − Q1² − Q1·Q2 —— ③

→ Reaction curve of Firm 2 :- 2Q2 + Q1 = 270 ⇒ Q2 = (270 − Q1)/2 = 135 − Q1/2

Put in equation ③ :- π1 = 270 Q1 − Q1² − Q1 (135 − Q1/2) π1 = 270 Q1 − Q1² − 135 Q1 + Q1²/2 π1 = 135 Q1 − Q1²/2

dπ/dQ1 = 135 − (1/2)·2Q1 = 0 ⇒ 135 = Q1*

Now, Q₂* = (135 − d₁)/2 = 67.5 Price : P* = 300 − Q₁ − Q₂ = 97.5 Profit of Firm 1 :- π₁ = 97.5 × 135 − 30 × 135 = 9112.5 Profit of Firm 2 :- π₂ = 97.5 × 67.5 − 30 × 67.5 = 4556.25

Thus, firm 2 earns higher profit- and firm 2 earns lower profit than in Cournot equilibrium.

(iii) Reaction curves :- Case 1 : Cournot Case 2 : Stackelberg

[two graphs of Q₂ against Q₁ with reaction curves RC₁ and RC₂: Case 1 : Cournot, equilibrium at 90 on both axes; Case 2 : Stackelberg, equilibrium on RC₂ at 67.5 on the Q₂ axis and 135 on the Q₁ axis]

Market Price Comparison :- Price in Case 1 = 120 Price in Case 2 = 97.5 → This is because higher quantity is produced in second case → 202.5 units, compared to 180 units in case 1