The booklet prints no question (question 8(a), as the candidate numbers it); the answer is written to a numerical duopoly problem with market demand Q = 160 - 2P and marginal cost 2, asking for the equilibrium under Cournot competition, Bertrand competition and with firm 1 as a Stackelberg leader.
Dipti Ranjan Pati, AIR 164, 2024
Q = 160 - 2P , Q = Q1 + Q2 .
So, P = 80 - Q/2 . MC = 2
(i) Cournot involves quantity-based competition.
π1 = PQ1 - TC1 . = [80 - (Q1+Q2)/2] Q1 - TC1 ---(a)
π2 = PQ2 - TC2 = [80 - (Q1+Q2)/2] Q2 - TC2 ---(b) .
FOCs dπ1/dQ1 = 80 - Q1 - Q2/2 - 2 = 0 . So, Q1 = 80 - Q2/2 - 2 ---(c)
Similarly dπ2/dQ2 = 80 - Q2 - Q1/2 - 2 = 0 So, Q2 = 80 - Q1/2 - 2 ---(d) .
Solving (c) & (d), Q1 = 80 - 1/2 [80 - Q1/2 - 2] - 2 So, Q1 = 80 - 40 + Q1/4 + 1 - 2 So, Q₁ - Q₁/4 = 39 So, 3Q₁/4 = 39
So, Q₁ = 39×4/3 = 52
Q₂ = 80 - 26 - 2 = 52 .
So, Q₁ = Q₂ = 52
(ii) Bertrand - Price Competition .
→ Here both firms seek to undercut each other and thus, capture the maximum market share . → This process continues till both reach the marginal cost = 2 .
At P = mc = 2 , 2 = 80 - Q/2 So, Q/2 = 78 So, Q = 156 .
Since both have similar costs, market will be divided equally so that Q₁ = Q₂ = 78 .
(iii) With firm 1 acting as the leader, it will take into account firm 2's reaction function in its own profit maximisation.
Firm 2 π2 = [80 - (Q1+Q2)/2] Q2 - TC2 .
FOC dπ2/dQ2 = 80 - Q2 - Q1/2 - 2 = 0
⇒ Q2 = 80 - Q1/2 - 2 ---- (a) ↓ Firm 2's Reaction function.
Firm 1 π1 = [80 - (Q1 + (80 - Q1/2 - 2)/2)] Q1 - TC1
= [80 - (2Q1 + 160 - Q1 - 4)/4] Q1 - TC1
= [80 - (Q1 + 156)/4] Q1 - TC1 .
FOC dπ1/dQ1 = 80 - Q1/2 - 39 - 2 = 0
So, Q1/2 = 39. So, Q1 = 78 Q2 = 80 - 78/2 - 2 = 39