Topper Copies

The inverse demand function in a duopoly market is P = 300 − Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2, Q is total output and Q1 and Q2 are the output of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of Rs. 30 per unit and zero fixed costs. (i) Suppose both the firms decide their output simultaneously. Why are the quantities chosen by each firm? What are the market price and profit of both the firms? (ii) Suppose now that the firm decide their output sequentially and the first firm is the market leader and the second is the follower. What are the quantities chosen by both the firms? What are the market price and profit of both firms? (iii) Draw diagram for the above two cases. Compare the market price in part i with that in part ii.

Raghav Jhunjhunwala, AIR 4, 2025

Q = q1 + q2 P = 300 - Q MC = 30

(i)

π1 = P·q1 - C·q1 = [300 - (q1 + q2)] q1 - 30 q1 = 270 q1 - q1^2 - q1 q2

For eq^m; ∂π/∂q1 = 0 => 270 - 2q1 - q2 = 0 => q1 = 1/2 (270 - q2) B.R.F (i)

Similarly, q2 = 1/2 (270 - q1) B.R.F (ii)

Putting BRF (ii) into BRF (i), we get q1 = 1/2 [270 - 1/2 (270 - q1)] q1 = 270/2 - 1/4 (270) + 1/4 q1 3/4 q1 = 1/4 (270) => q1 = q2 = 90

P = 300 - (90+90) P = 120

π1 = P.q1 - C.q1 = 120 . 90 - 30 . 90 π1 = 90 x 90 = 8100 = π2

(ii) Qty. leadership

we need to Incorporate B.R.F. (ii) into π1 Thus; π1 = 270q1 - q1² - q1 . [1/2 (270 - q1)]

= 270q1 - q1² - 270/2 q1 + q1²/2

∂π1/∂q1 = 0 => d/dq1 (270 q1 - q1²/2 - 270/2 q1) = 0

270 - q1 - 270/2 = 0

270/2 = [q1 = 135]

As B.R.F (2) q2 = 1/2 (270 - 135) = 135/2 = 67.5

π1 = p·q1 − c·q1 = (97.5)(135) − 30(135) = (67.5)(135) = 135/2 × 135

P = 300 − (135 + 67.5) P = 300 − 202.5 P* ~ 97.5

π2 = p·q2 − c·q2 = (97.5)(67.5) − (30)(67.5) = (67.5)²

clearly π1 > π2

(iii)

[a reaction-curve graph with Q2 against Q1: BRF1 and BRF2 crossing at the Cournot point (90, 90), and the Stackelberg point on BRF2 at (270/2, 67.5)]

Firm 1 (Stackelberg Leader) enjoys more profit & production than firm 2.

market prices have also reduced in stackelberg scenario.

Thus, stackelberg quantity leader can undercut its competitor by moving first & supplying more to the market.