It is often argued that despite intense conflicts, nuclear parity has prevented full-scale war between India and Pakistan. Critically assess this claim.
Simrandeep Kaur, AIR 15, 2025
The Nuclear deterrence theory acted well between India and Pakistan as post 1998, there was no major Conventional warfare between the two.
However, 1999, Kargil war (localised, not widespread) and Pakistan's war by other means (Uri, Pahalgam, 26/11) raises the question on efficacy of nuclear deterrence.
The Nuclear parity between India and Pakistan is promoting high threshold for full scale war as per Thomas Schelling - uncertainty making the war less effective. This may be one of the major reason behind strategic restraint and cautious entanglements by India in Operation Sindoor as Rational Nuclear Actor.
Further, there is nuclear weapon promoted cold peace due to 2nd Strike capability, communication of Nuclear doctrines (India's No-first use and Pakistan's full spectrum) and credibility of MAD.
However, strategic realists like Brahma Chellaney argues that nuclear deterrence has weakened India despite having conventional warfare supremacy over Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been focusing on tactical Nuclear weapons, proxy terrorism and military escalation on Nuclear blackmailing. They have benefited [?] over India with low-nuclear threshold provocations.
Thus there is consideration of transforming India's NFU into First Use to enhance the nuclear deterrence against Pakistan terrorism.
Nuclear parity has promoted lack of parity [?] due to terrorism and tactical nuclearization.
Thus, it can be argued that there is nervous state of peace due to Nuclear Weapon and lack of Complete peace between India and Pakistan.