Topper Copies

How do China's increasing ties with South Asian countries affect regionalism, particularly in terms of SAARC and other sub-regional groupings?

Kiran Kamate, AIR 53, 2025

China's increasing footprint in South Asia is creating new problems for India's developmental aspirations in the region as "net security provider and first responder".

C. Raja Mohan calls the intersection of India's project expanse in the region with China's string of pearls encircling it as creating a "Samundra Manthan" - with new choke points and conflict points emerging in the region, e.g. transcontinental port/Gwadar port, Seychelles island, Mauritius, etc.

[a hand-drawn map of India and the region, with China labelled to the north, arrows pointing toward India from the northwest, and Sri Lanka marked to the south]

China's increasing engagement with Maldives, under the anti-India movement of the "India Out" campaign, and increasing anti-India development projects, is a case in point.

Similarly, the increasing Pakistan-China-Bangladesh axis, with Md. Yunus calling the northeastern states "landlocked", is irking New Delhi.

This hinders the already struggling SAARC, which is under the shadow of Indo-Pakistan tension, as S.D. Muni highlights. The addition of the China axis makes it a deadlock.

Similarly, initiatives like BIMSTEC are also a non-starter, with increasing disturbances in Myanmar aided by Chinese arms and ammunition, creating unrest.

Rajeev Sikri calls this an axis of [?] in turbulence and an axis of uncertainty, against the idea of India hosting to create an axis of communication and prosperity.

India is thus boxed up in South Asia, as Happymon Jacob highlights, and faces the problem of small politics in South Asia, i.e. India viewing its neighbourhood with a Chinese lens additionally.

Perhaps Brahma Chellaney's advice that India needs to deliver faster, and not just promise, to create an alternative hegemony in a tumultuous South Asia.

"The elephant must prevail over the Dragon."