It is often argued that despite intense conflicts, nuclear parity has prevented full-scale war between India and Pakistan. Critically assess this claim.
Rakhi, AIR 65, 2025
India and Pakistan recently encountered each other in operation Sindoor, charged by India after Pahalgam Terror Attack on April 2025.
This operation reached a ceasefire and was seen as cause of deterrence due to both nations being nuclear weaponed states.
India became a nuclear weapon state after the operation Smiling Buddha was undertaken by Vajpayee government in 1998. This led Pakistan to acquire the nuclear weapons immediately after this.
This was followed by Kargil conflicts in 1999, attack on Parliament in 2001, Mumbai attack, 2008, Pulwama attack, 2019. However, these were only considered small scale attacks in comparison to full scale war, as was observed during 1965 war and 1971 war.
Moreover, these were undertaken by non-state actors and refusal by state government in any involvement. This has led to reduced inter-state conflicts.
This has been part of the deterrence strategy, as was propounded by Thomas Schelling, where the two nations fear large damage. This has been enforced by the presence of nuclear weapons, which has been called as 'new weapons of peace' by Kenneth Waltz.
India follows 'No 1st use policy' which acts as 'Deterrence by denial', whereas Pakistan favours no such policy. This has led India to change it's strategy to 'Deterrence by Punishment', as was seen in Uri surgical strikes.
However, the use of nuclear weapons can emerge in the future, as credible deterrence requires both parties to be rational, which Pakistan is not and called a "mad child holding a loaded gun". Thus, need is for strategy change to 'Deterrence by Compellance' as was seen in operation 'Sindoor'.